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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This is an Appeal fron the Second Judicial District Court, County of Davis, State 
of Utah - The Honorable Douglas Cornaby, Presiding, 
The Captioned Court's Jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to the fact that The 
Appellant was convicted of "THEFT OF A MOTOR VEHICLE " ( A Second degree felony) 
And consistent therewith The Provisions of 78-2a-3 (2)(e) U. G. A. confers 
Jurisdiction upon The Captioned Court. 
00000O00000 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
POINT I. 
THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS PLACED IN SERIOUS DOUBT BY VIRTUE OF 
THE APPARENT FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROCEED UNDSR THE STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS WHICH "CLEARLY COVERED " THE FACTUAL DATA OF THE INSTANT CASE. 
POINT II. 
THE APPELLANT WAS ERRONEOUSLY SENTENCED TO FIFTEEN YEARS PURSUANT TO THE 
GENERAL PROVISIONS OF 76-6-40** U. G. A. THAT ARE ENFORCED AT 76^6-412 U. C. A. 
DESPITE THE RULINGS OF THIS COURT AND THE UTAH SUPREME COURT THAT " SPECIAL 
PROVISIONS ARE CONTROLLING OVER GENERAL PROVISIONS ON THE VERY SAME SUBJKST." 
AND AS A DIRECT CONSEQUENCE THEREOF, THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION IS FATALLY 
DEFECTIVE UPON ITS FACE. 
( _ "I «*"* 
POINT III. 
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO GIVE AN " ELEMENTS JURY INSTRUCTION " IN THE 
INSTANT CASE, WHEN VIEWED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE CONCESSION OF ASSISTANT 
ATTORNEY GENERAL, SANDRA J. SJOGREN IN THE DECEMBER 31, 1991 UTAH SUPREME COURT 
CASE OF STATE V.MARSHALL GLEN JONES. , Case No. 890297 That " STATE V. LAINB , 
618 P.2d 33 ( UTAH 1980) WAS " CONTROLLING " WHERE AN "ELEMENTS JURY INSTRUCTION" 
IS NOT GIVEN, (AS OCCURRED IN THE INSTANT CASE) NO DIFFERENT RESULT SHOULD BE 
REACHED IN THE INSTANT CASE CONSISTENT WITH THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE 
OF " EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS " UNDER THE 14th. AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I. SECTION 24. CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. THE APPELLANTS 
CONVICTION SHOULD LIKEWISE BE " REVERSED AND REhANDED ". 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS RELIED UPON IN THE INSTANT CASEI 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION! 
THE 14th. AMENDMENT"! 
All persons born or naturalized in The United States and subject to 
the Jurisdiction thereof are citizens of The United States and of 
the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any 
Law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
The United States ; Nor shall any State deprive any person of LIFE 
LIBERTY OR PROPERTY without Due Process of Lawj Nor deny to any 
person within its Jurisdiction, The EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAHl 
ARTICLE I. SECTION 241 
All Laws of A General Nature Shall have uniform operation, 
UTAH STATE STATUTORY PROVISIONS! 
76-6-404 U. C. A. - THEFT - ELEMENTS! 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized 
control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive 
him thereof, 
76-6-412 - THEFT -CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENSES. 
(l) Theft of Property And Services As Provided in This ©lapter shall 
be punishable! 
(a) AS A FELONY OF THE SECOND DEGREE IF THEi 
( i i ) Property s t o l e n i s a firearm of AN OPERABl.rc IKVIV» 
VKwrm.i? 
^ CITING FROM THE PROVISIONS OF 76-6-412 U. C. A. IN FART PERTINENT ) 
41-1* 109 U. 0. A. UNLAWFUL CONTROL OYER VEHICLES - PENALTIES i^  
(l)Any person who exercise unauthorized control over a vehicle, not 
his own, without the consent of the owner or lawful custodian and 
with intent to temporarily deprive the owner of lawful Custodian 
of possession of the vehicle , is GUILTY OF A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR. 
(2) An offense under this section is a third degree felony if The 
Actor does not return the vehicle to the owner or lawful custodian 
within 24 hours after the exercise of unauthorized control. 
( IN PART PERTINENT ) 
41-1-112 - RECEIVING OR TRANSFERRING STOLEN VEHICLE - A FELONYi 
Any person , who with intent to procure or pass title to 
A VEHICLE which he know or has reason to believe has been 
stolen or unlawfully taken. Receives or transfers possession 
of the same from or to another, or who has in his possession 
any vehicle which he knows or has reason to believe has been 
stolen or unlawfully taken and who is not an officer of the Law 
engaged at the time in the performance of his duty as such 
officer IS GUILTY OF A FELONYi, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE, 
The Appellant was charged with allegedly EXERCISING UNAUTHORIZED CONTROL OVER 
THE MOTOR VEHICLE OF ANOTHER WITH INTENT TO DEPRIVE THE QWMBR THEREOF, In violation 
of the provisions of 76-6-404 U. C. A. Which are enforced at 76-6-412 (l)(a)(il)UCA 
ind in a JURY TRIAL, The Appellant was convicted and sentenced and committed to the 
Itah State Prison for the said " SECOND DEGREE FELONY " " THEFT" OF A MOTOR VEHICLE, 
The Appellants HABEAS PETITION Chsllenging The TRIAL COURT*S LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER 
URISDICTION WAS SUMMARILY DENIED by The Trial Court and therebv n*»n»««<+»+»^  *»•- *--* " 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Prosecution afiled to proceed under the STATUTORY PROVISIONS which have been 
declared to ' CLEARLY COVER the M THEFT" AND TRAFFICKING IN STOLEN AUTOMOBILES , and 
The UTAH SUPREME COURT IN STATE V. PORTER, 502 P.2d 1147, 1148 declared that 
SPECIFIC STATUTE to be the provisions of 41-1-112 U. C. A. | Further, The Prosecution 
overlooked the RULINGS OF THIS COURT AND THE UTAH SUPREME COURT THAT " SPECIAL PROVISIONS 
ARE CONTROLLING OVER GENERAL PROVISIONS ON THE SAME SUBJECT . " And finally, The Trial 
Court committed REVERSIBIfi ERROR , in failing to INSTRUCT THE JURY AS TO THE REQUISITE 
ELEMENTS of the alleged "THEFT OF A MOTOR VEHICLE " And under the weight of authority 
relative thereto, The Appellant's conviction should not be allowed to stand* 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
IN LIGHT OF THE APPARENT FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION W*8 ' UNDER THE GENERAL 
PROVISIONS OF 76-6-404 U. C. A. WHICH ARE ENFORCED AT 76-6-412(1)(a)(il) U. C. A. 
RELATIVE TO THE ALLEGED " THEFT » OF M AN OPERABLE MOTOR VEHICLE '" INSTEAD OF 
THE SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF 41-1-112 U. 0. A. SHOULD BE DECLARED FATAL TO THE 
VALIDITY OF THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION, 
In support of the foregoing contentions, The Appellant respectfully submits that 
The UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS REPEATEDLY AND CONSISTENT HELD THATi 
" NO MATTER HOW REPREHENSIBLE THE CONDUCT OF THE 
ACCUSED MAY BE, YET NO PUNISHMENT MAY BE INFLICTED 
WITHOUT A LAW AUTHORIZING ITA AND SUCH LAW MUST 
CLEARLY COVER THE CASE. " 
cf. OGDEN CITY V. McLAUGHLIN. 5 UTAH 387 
SEE ALSOl STATE V. HICKEN. 659 P.2d 1038 ( UTAH 1983) 
STATE ¥•. HILL. 688 P.2d 450 (UTAH 1984 ) 
STATE V. SCOTT. 732 P.2d 117( UTAKL987) 
because The Utah Supreme Court has declared that The provisions of 41-1-112 U.C.A. 
•ere enacted by The Utah Legislature to " PREVENT THE STEALING AND TRAFFICKING IN STOLEN 
UTOMOBILES " ( SEE* STATE V. PORTER, Supra*. ) , it is readily apparent that the 
30VISIONS of 76-6-404 U. G. A. And 76-6-412 U. C. A. DO NOT CLEARLY COVER the MOTOR 
YEHifiLS THEFT w that allegedly oocurred in the instant case and therefore the eanvietion 
of the Appellant under obviously INAPPLICABLE PROVISIONS should be declared FATAL TO 
THE VALIDITY OF THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION. 
POINT II» 
BECAUSE THIS COURT AND THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAVE (BOTH) DECLARED THAT WHEN, AS 
EXIST IN THE INSTANT CASE, THE VERI SAME CONDUCT IS COVERED UNDER TWO DIFFERENT 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS WHICH ARE < &) GENERAL ( e.g., 76-4-W U, 0. A. AKD 
76-6-^12 (l)(a)(il) U» G. A.) PURSUANT TO WHICH THE APPELLANT WAS CONVICTED AND 
(b) SPECIAL PROVISIONS ( e.g., *H-1~112 U, C, A. ) THE M PROVISIONS SPECIAL ARE 
CONTROLLING OVER THE GENERAL PROVISIONS11 AND FOR SUCH SPECIFIC REASON, THE 
APPELLANTS CONVICTION SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO STAND. 
The Appellant respectfully submits that the EXACT WORDING OF THE GENERAL PROVISIONS 
of 76~6-4(& U» C. A# are worded as followst 
76-6-404. Theft — Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises 
unauthorized control over the property of another 
with a purpose to aepnve him thereof. 1973 
And the above provisions of 76->6-40fr U« C. A. Are enforced by the following provisions 
o f
 76-6-412 ( l ) (a ) l l l ) U. 0. A, 
76-6-412, Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for 
treble damages against receiver of stolen prop-
erty. 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be pun-
ishable: r 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services exceeds $1,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft-
or ' 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another; 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is more than $250 but not more 
than $1,000; 
(ii) actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery or 
any burglary with intent to commit theft; or 
(iii) property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer 
steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was 
more than $100 but does not exceed $250; or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was $100 or less. 
7 « ( * ^ £ ^ ™ I S w h o h a s b e e n i n j u r e d h? a Eolation of Subsection 
i t * 1X2 o l ^ Y Hng a n a c t i 0 n a g a i n s t a n ^ P e r s o n mentioned in Subsection 
/b-b-408(2)(d) for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained 
Dy the plaintiff, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-412, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-412; 1974, ch. 32, § 18; 
1975, ch. 48, § 1; 1977, ch. 89, § 1; 1989, ch. 
78, § 1. 
wmxe the SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF 41-1-112 U. C. A. ARE WORDED AS FOLLOWS l 
41-1-112. Receiving or transferring stolen vehicle 
a felony. 
Any person who, with intent to procure or pass, 
title tn a vehicle which he knows or has reason to I 
bel!eve"nas been stbleiTor unlawfully taken, _jeceivesj. 
or transfers possession of the same from or .to 
another, or who has in his possession any vehille 
which he knows or has reason'to believe has been 
stolen or unlawfully taken,.;and who is not an 
officer of the law engaged at .the time in the perfo: 
rmance of his duty as such officer,^ guilty of a 
felony, sins #*+**•«*« few 4 1 * • > - '" - " 
when the above SPBClftL PROVISIONS of 41-1-112 U. C. A, are considered in light 
of This Court's And The UTAH SUPREME COURT'S declaration that " PROVISIONS SPECIAL ARE 
CONTROLLING OVER GENERAL PROVISIONS " ( ON THE SAME SUBJECT ) I 
SEEl FLOYD V. WESTERN SURGERICAL ASSOC.INC. 773 P.2d 401, 404 ( Ut.Ct. App.,1989) 
BAGSHAW V. BAGSHAW. 788 P. 2d 1057 ( Ut Ct. Appeals 1990) 
SEE ALSOi RAMMELL V. TURNER. 56O P.2d 1128 ( UTAH 1979) 
HELMUTCH v. MORRIS. 595 ?.2d. 333 ( UTAH 1979) 
STATE V. BURNHAM. . 49 P,2d 963, 965 ( UTAH 1935) 
CANNON V. GARDNER. 611 P.2d 1207 j| UTAH 1980) 
STATE V. HAMBLIN. 676 P.2d 376 ( UTAH 1983 ) 
And additionally viewed in conjunction with the UTAH SUPREME COURT'S CONSTRUCTION 
of the above SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF 41-1-112 IT. C. A. and in STATE V. PORTER. 28 UTAH 2d 
364, 502 P.2d 1147, 1148 asserted thati 
H
 THE INTENT OF THE UTAH LEGISLATURE IN ITS 
ENACTMENT OF THE PROVISIONS OF 41-1-112 U. Q. A. 
WAS TO PREVENT THEHSTEALING AND TRAFFICKING IN 
STOLEN MOTOR VEHICLES." 
cf. STATE V. PORTER. Supra., 
It is INESCAPABLY APPARENT that The Appellant has been convicted and imprisoned 
pursuant to the GENERAL PROVISIONS OF 26-6-404 U. 0,., A. AND 76-6^12 (l)(a)(ii) U. Q. A. 
instead of the SEECIAL AND CONTROLLING PROVISIONS of 41-1-112 U. C. A. AND for such 
specific reason, The Appellant's conviction should not be allowed to stand. 
f - A _ eSTATE1 V i n r n o n c M r »»~ 
POINT I I I , 
DESPITE THE OVERWHELMING UTAH SUPREME COURT RULINGS TO THE CONTRARY, TO THE 
CONTRARY, THE TRIAL COURT IN THE INSTANT CASE, NEVERTHELESS FAILED TO GIVE THE 
" ELEMENTS JURY INSTRUCTION" THAT WAS OMITTED IN THE JURY TRIAL OP NORMAN LAINE 
IN STATE V. LAINB. 6l7T P . 2 d 3 3 ( UTAH S E P T , , 1 2 , 1 9 8 0 ) AND WAS THEREIN DECLARED 
" REVERSIBLE ERROR" AND I T REASONABLY FOLLOWS THEREFROM, THAT THE APPELLANTS 
CONVICTION, LIKE THE CONVICTION IN STATE V, LAINE, SUffiA., KUST ALSO FALL IN 
THE INTEREST OF * EVEN HANDED*JUSTICE " AND CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED " EQUAL 
PROTECTION OF THE LAWS N UNDER THE l ^ t h . AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION. 
The Appel lan t r e s p e c t f u l l y submits t h a t t he most CONVINCING way he knows t o 
s u b s t a n t i a t e the foregoing c o n t e n t i o n s , i s t o r e s p e c t f u l l y submit the ACTUAL RULING 
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT IN PART PERTINENT, AS TO THE UTAH SUPREME COURTfS MAJORITY 
DECISION IN THE CASE OF STATE V. MARSHAL GLEN JONES. Case No. 890297 (Dec. 31* 1991)1 
The S t a t e c o n c e d e s t h a t S t ^ t e v . L a i n e , 613 P . 2 ^ 33_a_ 
( U t a h 1 9 8 0 ) / c o n t r o l s t h i s i s s u e / ' The l aw m t n r s " s t a t e ' " i s 
t h a t an i n f o r m a t i o n i n s t r u c t i o n i s n o t a s u b s t i t u t e f o r an 
e l e m e n t s i n s t r u c t i o n . The j u r y m u s t b e i n s t r u c t e d w i t h r e s p e c t 
t o a l l t h e l e g a l e l e m e n t s t h a t i t m u s t f i n d t o c o n v i c t o f t h e 
c r i m e c h a r g e d , and t h e a b s e n c e of s u c h w a p i n s t r u c t i o n i s 
r e v e r s 1 b 1 e e r r o r a s a m a t f e r ~ o f ~ 1aw. L a i r i e , 618 P . 2 d * a t " 35 . 
t r s t a E e ' v , R o B ^ r t s , 7 1 1 P . 2 d 235 ( U t a h 1 9 8 5 ) , we s t a t e d , "The 
g e n e i a l r u l e i s t h a t an a c c u r a t e i n s t r u c t i o n u p o n t h e b a s i c 
e l e m e n t s o t an o f f e n s e i s e s s e n t i a l . F a i l u r e t o s o i n s t r u c t 
c o n s t i t u t e s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . " Ld. a t 239 ( U t a h 1 9 8 5 ) ( c i t i n g 
L a i n e , 618 P . 2 d a t 3 5 ) . S e e a l s o S t a t e v . Ha rmon , 712 P . 2 d 
2 9 1 , 292 ( U t a h 1 9 8 6 ) ( p e r c u r i a m ) ; S t a t e v . R e e d y , 6 8 1 P . 2 d 
1 2 5 1 , 1252 ( U t a h 1 9 8 4 ) . T h u s , t h e f a i l u r e t o g i v e t h i s 
i n s t r u c t i o n c a n n e v e r b e h a r m l e s s e r r o r . 
T h e c o m p l e t e a b s e n c e o f an e l e m e n t s i n s t r u c t i o n on a 
c r i m e c h a r g e d i s an e r r o r we r e v i e w t o a v o i d m a n i f e s t 
i n j u s t i c e . S e e U t a h R. C r i m . P . 1 9 ( c ) ; S t a t e v . L e s l e y , 672 
P . 2 d 7 9 , 8 1 ( U t a h 1 9 8 3 ) ; S c r e w s v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 325 U . S . 9 1 , 
107 ( 1 9 4 5 ) ; S t a t e v . C o b o , 60 P . 2 d 9 5 2 , 9 5 8 - 5 9 ( U t a h 1 9 3 6 ) ; 
P e o p l e v . W i c k e r s h a m . 32 C a l . 3d 3 0 7 , 650 P . 2 d 3 1 1 , 3 2 6 - 2 7 , 185 
C a l . R p t r . 436 ( 1 9 8 2 ) ( e n b a n c ) . Cf . S t a t e v . B e l l , 563 P . 2 d 
1 8 6 , 187 ( U t a h 1 9 7 7 ) . I t f o l l o w s t h a t e v e n t h o u g h J o n e s f a i l e d 
t o o b j e c t t o t h e l a c k o f an e l e m e n t s i n s t r u c t i o n when t h e 
i n s t r u c t i o n s w e r e g i v e n , t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s c o m p l e t e f a i l u r e t o 
g i v e an e l e m e n t s i n s t r u c t i o n on a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g i s c l e a r 
e r r o r a n d r e q u i r e s r e v e r s a l o f t h e c o n v i c t i o n and r e m a n d f o r a 
new t r i a l on t h a t c h a r g e . 
With the Utah A s s i s t a n t At torney G e n e r a l ' s ( l . e« SANJDRA J . SJOGREN'S ) Above 
0needing t h a t STATE V. LAINE. 618 P.2d 33 ( UTAH I98O ) "CONTROLS THIS ISSUE " 
( MEANING THAT , WHERE, AS EXIST IN THE INSTANT CASE, THE TRIAL COURT HAS FAILED TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT t 
M
 BEFORE RETURNING A VERDICT OF GUILTY, THEY MUST FIND THAT 
DEFENDANT HAD THE CONSCIOUS OBJECTIVE TO WITHHOLD THE 
PROPERTY; ( THE AUTOMOBILE )PERMANENTLY. M 
cf. STATE V, LAINE. 618 P.2d at 35, 
THUS, inasmuch as the instant ease cannot be materially distinguished from STATS 
V. LAINE, Supra., NO DIFFERENT RESULT SHOULD BE REACHED IN THE INSTANT CASK THAN WAS 
ACCORDED IN STATE V, LAJHe. 6l8 P.2d 33 ( UTAH 1980 - Sept.12, I98O -ALOMST TWELVE /l2/ 
YEARS AGO.,) AND REAFFIRMED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT ON DECEMBER 31, 1991 IN STATE V. 
MARSHALL GLEN JONES, Supra., NO DIFFERENT RESULT SHOULD BE REALIZED IN THE INSTANT CASE, 
CONSISTENT WITH THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF H EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS" 
That is spelled out in the PRE-1984 EDITION OF CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM ON " CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW " - VOLUME 16-A. SECTION 505, where the following position is taken by The UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURTl 
" ALL PERSONS SUBJECT TO STATE LEGISLATION AND WHO UNDER LIKE 
CIRCUMSTANCES AND ARE SIMILARLY SITUATED, MUST BE TREATED THE 
SAME, BOTH AS TO PRIVILEGES CONFERRED AND LAIBILITIES IMPOSED." 
cf. FRANCIS v. RESWEBER. 329 U. S. 459 ( 19^7 ) 
SEEi The abundance of additional cases there cited. 
Further, ... " RIGHT OF CITIZENS WHO ARE SIMILARLY SITUATED TO BE TREATED 
EQUALLY BY THE LAW IS A WELL SETTLED PRINCIPLE OF JURISPRUDENCE" 
MeGOWAN .t. STATE OF MARYLAND , 366 U. S. 420 ( I96I) 
MCLAUGHLIN v. STATE OF FLORIDA. 379 u. s. 184 ( 1964) 
" THE MANDATE OF THE 14th. AMENDMENT requires A STATE TO TREAT 
ALL SIMILARLY SITUATED PERSONS ALIKE • 
CITY OF CLEBURNE TEXAS V. CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER. 473 U.S.432 
( 1985 ) 
FLYLER V. DOE. 457 U. S. 202 ( 1982 ) 
Surely, " FAIR PLAY " which has been declared to be » AT THE HEART OF DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW M BOLLING V. SHABfl. 347 «. S. 499 ( 195^ ) t GALVAN V. PRESS. 347 U. S. 532 (1954) 
(8m, STATE! V- AMTOTBCsriW _ Mrt nnntai. -•* » 
If, INDEED, " JUSTICE IS TO SATISFY THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE." 
OFFUTT V. UNITED STATES 348 U. S. 11 (1955) 
IN RE MURCHISON. 349 U. S. 133 ( 1955 ) 
MARSHALL V. JERRICO. INC.. 4460 U. S. 238 ( 1980 ) 
MAYBERRY V. PENNSYLVANIA. 400 U. S. 455 ( 1979) 
WHILE THE APPELLANT was not entitled to " A PERFECT TRIAL " ( LUTWAK V. UNITED STATES. 
344 U. S. 601 ( 1953)l He was indeed entitled to " A FAIR TRIAL " ( MURPHY V. STATE OF 
FLORIDA. 421 U. S. 79^ ( 1975 ) 
And " PROSECUTORS HAVE A DUTY ABOVE PROSECUTIONS AND CONVICTIONS AND THAT IS TO SEE 
THAT JUSTICE IS DONE " ( cf. CORDIANNA V. MORRIS. 59^ P.2d 874 /UTAH 1979/) Surely, 
it is not reasonable to presume that JUSTICE WAS DONE WHERE THE PROSECUTION CAUSE THE 
APPELLANT TO RECEIVE 1-15 YEARS FOR THE VERY SAME OFFENSE OF "THEFT OF A MOTOR VEHICLE 
FOR WHICH THE FOLLOWING TWENTY (20) MEN ONLY RECEIVED FIVE (5) YEARS' 
THUS. WE HAVE THE FOLLOWING TWENTY (20) OF FIFTY (50) OR MORE CONVICTIONS 
FOR " THEFT OF MOTOR VEHICLES " AND YET ONLY RECEIVED A SENTENCE OF FIVE (5) 
'STATE PRISON TERM AND WERE THEREFORE ACCORDED A DIFFERENT BRAND OF JUSTICE 
THAN WAS ACCORDED THE DEFBNDANT-MOVANT ; IN THE INSTANT CASE. 
INMATES NAMESi 
,Johnny M. Tones 
PAROLE 
RELEASE DATSt 
Nov* 14. 1989 
REFERENCE - WHERE VERIFICATION EXIST 
RBi SALT LAKE TRIBUNE -DATE AND PAGE 
JUNE 18. 1989 - Page B-5 
.Ronald R. Peterson Jan..23. 1990 March 12.1989 - Page B-14 
.Nicholas K. Yazzie Oct..24,198c April 20. 1989 - Page B-9 
Archie L. Hayes Dec. 12. 1989 July 12. 1989 - Page B-8 
Benjamin Werner April 25tl?89 April 2. 1989 - Page B-6 
. Ricky Humphries July 25, I989 April 2. 1989 - Page B-6 
Ronald L. Clegg Jan..23. 1990 Augusx 27.1989 - Page B-ll 
Timothy E. Bywater Feh.13.1990 Dec. 3. 1989 - Page B.-I1 
Larry Yarrlngton Feb.25. 1992 
Feb..26,199T 
Dec.9. 1989 - Page B-ll 
Michael L. Barrett Jan..21. 1990 - Page B-8 
Grady Boutwell Aug..14.1990 Jan.. 7. 1990 - Page B-17 
Kevin A. Hill Feb..27. 1990 Jan.. 7. 1990 - Page B-17 
Keith J. Burg Jan,. 8. 1991 March 4. 1990 - Page B-13 
Dennis E. Evenil Oct.,9. 1990 March 4. 1990 - Page B-13 
Jose G. Ortls June 6.1991 May 6. 1990 - Page B-6 
Duane B. Johnson May 14. 1991 Oct..28. 1990 - Page B-9 
John S. Kallas April 9. 1991 Nov..18. 1990 - Page B-5 
Russell Wlgren May 28. 1991 Feb..10. 1991 - Page B-9 
John D.Hlllard April 9.1991 Sept..2. 1990 - Page B-4 
April 2. 1989 - PagelJMT Oreste Rodriguez Sept. J^ . 1989 
The Supreme Court has directed thati 
" WHILE PROSECUTORS MAY STIKR HARD BLOWS, THEY 
ARE NOT AT LIBERTY TO STRIKE FOUL ONES, " 
OF. BERGER V. UNITED STATES . 298 U.S.78 (1935) 
And because The Prosecution erroneously proceeded; with the prosecution of the instant 
case under the INAPPLICABLE GENERAL PROVISIONS OF 76-6-404 U. 0. A. in lieu of the 
SPECIAL AND HENCE CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF 41-1-112 U. C. A., such prosecutorial BLUNDER 
sufficed to divest the TRIAL COURT of subject-matter Jurisdiction which both the SUPREME 
COURT And The UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH (10th. ) CIRCUIT have ruled I 
" SUBJECT-MATTER JURSIDICTION CANHDT BE WAIVED 
NOR CONFERRED UPON THE COURTS BY CONSENT, 
INACTION, NOR STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES » 
SEEl CALIFORNIA V. LARUE. 409 U. S. 109 (1973) 
UNITED STATES V3, SIVIGLIA . 686. F. 2d 832 
(10th. Cir., 1981) 
The TRIAL COURT having thus proceeded and rendered Judgement WITHOUT ITS JURISDICTION 
HAVING BEEN PROPERLY INVOKED ACCORDING TO LAW, THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS J3ECLARED THAT 
such Judgement (rendered WITHOUT JURISDICTION) 
"MUST BE DECLARED A NULLMYi " 
cf. STATE V. TELFORD. 72 P.2d 626 
SEE ALSOl ALBBECHT V. UNITED STATES. 273 U. S. 1 (1927) 
BEDE V. POWERS. 268 U. S. 68 ( 1924 ) 
And The UTAH SUPREME COURT has accorded latitude to " RAISE THE QUESTION OF THE 
TRIAL COURT'S LACK OF JURSIDICTION AT ANY TIME " ( SEEl STATE V. MORRBY. 23 UTAH 273, 16 P. 
764. 
*» CONCLUSION «* 
With The SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF 41-1-109 U. C. A. AND 41-1-112 U. C. A. being 
indisputably " CONTROLLING " over The GENERAL PROVISIONS OF 76-6-404 U. 0. A. AND 
76-6-412 (l)(a)(li) U. C. A. there would not appear to be any reasonable ascertainable 
T S Wm,^~ » JVUW- J.U " B -
hasis pursuant to which the Appellant's conviction of M THEFT OF A MOTOR VEHICLE H 
can be allowed to LAWFULLY STAND, 
WHEREFORE, The Appellant prays that baaed upon the foregoing POINTS AND AUTHORITIES, 
The Appellantfs conviction will be vacated and set aside in the interest of a fair 
administration of * EVEN-HANDED JUSTICE, M • 
Dated this 6th* Day of August, 1992 
Respectfully Submitted, 
B3LIE C. ANDERSOK, Appelli lant 
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jssues in a trial, and alsV'attempts to partic-
ipate as counsel, puts himself in what would 
seem to be an embarrassing position of hav-
ing to contend for the-credibility of his own 
testimony.11 
Utah 33 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
[7] NotwithstandingE&hat has just been 
said, we make the further observation that 
inasmuch as an attorney'^ an officer of the 
court, the court can place special reliance 
upon his integrity and responsibility to it, as 
well as to his client, wherefore we think it 
would have been quite proper to allow Mr. 
Walker to remain in thercourtroom How-
ever, even if it should be assumed that 
Judge Leary abused hh discretion and that 
he should have permitted Mr, Walker to 
remain in the courtroomrthere is a consid-
eration even more important insofar as the 
justice of this case is concerned. From 
anything we are able—to perceive, Mr. 
Hintze made a competent-and complete pre-
sentation of the plaintiffs case, including 
the testimony of Mr Walker Accordingly, 
we do not see any such prejudice to the 
plaintiff as would warrant upsetting the 
findings and judgment. 
Affirmed. The parties to bear their own 
costs on appeal. 
MAUGHAN, WILKINS and HALL, JJ
 t 
concur. 
STEWART, J , concurs in result. 
Norman LAINE, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 167S8. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 12, 1980. 
Defendant was convicted in the Fourth 
District Court, Utah County, J. Robert Bull-
ock, J , of theft by deception, and he appeal-
ed. The Supreme Court, Wilkins, J., held 
that District Court's failure to include in-
struction that defendant must have intend-
ed to permanently deprive victim of posses-
sion of property m basic "elements" instruc-
tion was reversible error, which was not 
cured by "information" instruction stating 
the intent required for commission of the 
crime. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Crockett, C. J , dissented and filed opin-
ion in which Hall, J , concurred. 
1. Criminal Law <£=»447 
In prosecution for theft by deception, 
in which it was alleged that defendant 
obtained car from dealer by signing con-
tract for its purchase and upon his repre-
sentation that he needed the car to go di-
rectly to bank to get money was given the 
car and never returned, parol evidence rule 
could not properly be invoked to prevent 
state from showing facts relating to wheth-
er defendant intentionally deceived dealer 
in order to wrongfully obtain possession of 
the car and, therefore, district court did not 
err in admitting evidence explanatory of 
the circumstances under which the contract 
for the purchase of the car was executed. 
UC.A.1953, 76-6-405, 76-6-405(1), 76-6-
412, 76-£~412(l)(aX0. 
11. See Ethical Consideration, Canon 5. Com-
ment 9 of the Utah Code-of Professional Re-
sponsibility 
34 Utah 618 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
2. Criminal Law <&=»772(1), 1173.2(2) 
Generally, ^n accurate instruction upon 
the bask elements ol the ailense charged 't§ 
essential, and failure to so instruct consti' 
tutes reversible error. 
3. Criminal Law <s=* 1172^3) 
False Pretenses <&=>52~ 
In prosecution for theft by deception, 
failure to include element that defendant 
must be found to have intended to perma^ 
nently deprive victim of possession of prop' 
erty in basic "elements" instruction was 
reversible error, which-was not cured by 
"information" instruction stating the intent 
required for commission of the crime. U C 
A.1953, 7&-6-405, 7&~6-405(l), 76-6-412, 
76-6-412(l)(a)(i). 
4. Criminal Law <s=>822(6>-
So long as jury is informed what each 
element is and that each-must be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the instructions 
taken as a whole may be adequate even 
though the essential elements are found in 
more than one instruction. 
Robert J. Schumacher of Utah County 
Legal Defenders Association, Provo, for de^ 
fendant and appellant. 
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Herbert F. 
Smart, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and respondent.-
WILKINS, Justice: 
Defendant Norman Laine appeals his 
conviction by a jury of theft by deception in 
violation of Sections 76-6-405 and 76-6-
412, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended.1 
JFhe errors assigned are in rulings on evi-
dence and in instructions to the jury. 
On May 30, 1979, "defendant went to the 
University Lincoln-Mercury dealership in 
Provo and negotiated for the purchase of a 
1. Section 76-6 405(1) provides: "A person 
commits theft if he obtains or exercises control 
over property of another by deception and with 
a purpose to deprive him thereof" Section 
76-6-412( l)(a)(i) further provides that the theft 
of property and services as provided in that 
chapter shall be punishable as a felony of the 
new Lincoln automobile. The car and the 
price of $14,930 were agreed upon, and a 
contract was prepared and signed. Upon 
his representation that he needed the car to 
go directly to the bank in Springville, ap-
proximately five miles away, to get the 
money and return, the car was turned over 
to defendant. He never returned to the 
dealer, and the car was reported stolen two 
days later. On June 7, 1979, defendant was 
arrested in Minnesota while in possession of 
the car and was returned to Utah to stand 
trial. 
The defendant first attacks his conviction 
on the ground that the District Court erred 
in receiving the testimony of an employee 
of the car dealer in question who detailed 
defendant's conduct from the time defend-
ant first came into the showroom until the 
car was driven away. Defendant argues 
that since the contract relating to the "pur-
chase" of the car is an integrated contract, 
parol evidence of his representations lead-
ing up to the execution of the contract was 
inadmissible. 
The parol evidence rule is, of course, a 
rule of substantive law and not evidence. 
The rule presupposes an action involving an 
existing valid written contract, and is based 
on the premise that when the terms of an 
agreement have been reduced to a clear and 
unambiguous writing, that writing furnish-
es the best evidence of the understanding of 
the parties.2 
[1] In this case, the State is not a party 
to nor concerned with the enforcement of 
the terms of the written contract. Rather, 
the State is interested in the contract only 
to the extent that the contract evidences 
the commission of the crime charged. 
Therefore, the State is neither bound by the 
terms of the contract nor prohibited from 
showing that it was executed by the parties 
as one of the aspects of the situation upon 
second degree if the value of the property or 
services exceeds $1,000 
2. See. e. g. Kupka v Morev, 541 P 2d 740 
(Alaska 1975), Masterson v Sine, 68 Cal 2d 
222. 65 Cal Rptr 545. 436 P 2d 561 (1968), and 
generally 30 Am Jur 2d, Evidence, § 1016 
STATE v. 
ate is, UUh, 
which-the wme charged against defendant 
is based.1 -Accordingly, the parol evidence 
rule^tnnotjpjoperly be invoked ^ tor prevent 
the State from showing the-fasts-relating 
to the issue of whether the defendant inten-
tionally "deceived the victim in order to 
wrongfully obtain possession of the automo-
bile inljuesTtah.4 It follows that the Dis-
tricl~CSurt~~did not err in admitting the 
evidence explanatory of the circumstances 
under which the written contract was exe-
cuted. 
Defenda~nrnext maintains jthaL the Dis-
trict Court_committed reversible^error by 
giving instruction no. 7 which purports to 
state the "essential elements" of the crime 
charged, but^  fails to expressly include the 
element that the defendant must be found 
to have intended to permanently deprive 
the owner of possession of the automobile 5 
While it is true that the instructions must 
be viewed, and reviewed, as a whole,* we 
cannot agree with the State that any defect 
in instruction no 7 is cured by instruction 
no. 6.7 
[2] The general rule is: 
An accurate instruction upon the basic 
elements of the offense charged is essen-
tial, and the failure to so instruct consti-
tutes reversible error8 
3. See, $4 A L R 2d 570 and cases there cited 
4. Id 
5. That instruction states 
The essential elements of the crime of theft 
by deception as charged in the Information 
are as follows 
1 That the defendant. Norman Lame, un 
lawfully obtained a motor vehicle from Uni-
versity Lincoln Mercury in Provo, Utah 
County, Utah 
2 That the motor vehicle was operable 
3 That it was obtained bv deception 
4 That such deception occurred on or 
about May 30, 1979 
If you believe the evidence established each 
and all of the essential elements of the of-
fense beyond a reasonable doubt, it is >our 
duty to find the defendant guilty of the crime 
charged On the other hand if the evidence 
has failed to establish one or more of the 
elements of said offense as abo\e set forth 
beyond a reasonable doubt then you should 
LAINE Utah 35 
618P.2dl3 
[3] In our view, the failure to include 
the intent element in the basic "elements" 
instruction is reversible error. That in-
struction informs the jury that the State 
must prove each of the elements listed 
there beyond a reasonable doubt. Instruc-
tion no. 6-the "Information" instruction-
does refer to the intent required for com-
mission of the crime, but does not inform 
the members of the jury that before re-
turning a verdict of guilty, they must find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant 
had the conscious objective to withhold the 
property (the automobile) permanently. 
[4] In holding the instructions here to 
be fatally defective, we do not mean to 
imply that all of the elements^ of—the 
charged crime must necessarily be con-
tained in one instruction, though the better 
practice is, we think, to do so So long as 
the jury is informed what each element is 
and that each must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the instructions taken as 
a whole may be adequate even though the 
essential elements are found in more than 
one instruction 
Reversed and remanded for new trial 
MAUGHAN and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
find the defendant not guilty (emphasis add-
ed) 
6. See, e g , State v Coleman 17 Utah 2d 166, 
406 P2d 308 (1965) 
7. That instruction states 
You are instructed that the law of this 
State as applied to the cnme charged in the 
Information is as follows 
A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises control over property of another by 
deception and with a purpose to deprive him 
thereof 
"Purpose to deprive" within the meaning 
of the law and these Instructions means to 
have the conscious object to withhold the 
property permanently 
8. Doughertv v State, 471 P 2d 212, 213 (Nev 
1970) See, also. State v Miller, 565 P 2d 228 
(Kan 1977), Thomas v State, 522 P 2d 528 
(Alaska 1974), State v Puga 510 P 2d 1075 
(NMApp 1973), 23A C J S Criminal Law, 
§ 1193 
3 6 Utah 618 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
CROCKETT, Chief Justice (dissenting): 
The main opinion focuses jjpon one as-
serted-omission in one ^ingle4astruction as 
thejjasis for overturning the_verdict of a 
jury and the action of the trial court there-
on jafter extended investigatiortjmd what I 
think was a fair trial of the issues, resulting 
fn the conviction of the defendant. It does 
so in disregard of well-established rules 
recognized in the opinion itselfc 
The main opinion, correctly-^tates that 
the instructions must be~^Yiewed as a 
whole";l and that "we do~-not mean to 
imply that all of the elements ^f the crime 
charged must necessarily bezcontained in 
one instruction'11 
It is submitted that if those rules, which 
the opinion itself recognizes, are-~fairly and 
properly applied, it will be seen-Uiat there is 
no prejudicial deficiency in thejnstructions; 
and that they were adequate to_their pur-
pose of correctly advising the jury as to the 
issues to be determined and thejaw applica-
ble thereto. 
Instruction no. 2 states that the defend-
ant Norman Laine is charged with the 
crime of "theft by deception" of an automo-
bile from the University Lincoln-Mercury 
dealership. 
Instruction no. 6, given immediately pre-
ceding no. 7 about which complaint is made, 
states: 
You are instructed that the law of this 
state as applied to the crime charged in 
the Information is as follows: 
A person commits theft / /he obtains or 
exercises control over property of another 
by deception and with a purpose to de-
prive him thereof. 
"Purpose to deprive" within the mean-
ings of the law and these Instructions 
means to have the conscious object to 
withhold the property permanently. 
It seems to me quite inescapable that the 
defendant could not have_been prejudiced 
1. See footnote 6, mam opinion. 
2. I agree with the statement that it is better to 
do so However, that an otherwise inadequate 
instruct may be cured by other instructions, see 
by the failure of the court to include a 
statement concerning intent to permanently 
deprive the owner in that one particular 
instruction (no. 7). This is so because when 
instructions no. 2 and no. 6 are considered 
in connection therewith, the court plainly so 
told the jury. In sum, it is my judgment 
that there is no way whatsoever that the 
jury could fail to understand that, in order 
to find the defendant guilty, they must 
believe beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
intended to steal the automobile perma-
nently. Moreover, there is no view of the 
evidence that could lead anyone acting fair-
ly and reasonably thereon to any other con-
clusion. 
The reversal of the conviction on techni-
calities when a person has been afforded all 
of the ample protections of our law, includ-
ing a trial by a jury, has too long, too 
frequently, and with too much justification, 
been the subject of criticism by the public. 
The founders of our state were fully aware 
and sought to eliminate this by providing in 
the first edition of our state laws, Sec. 4975, 
RS. 1898, now Sec. 77-42-1, U.C.A. 1953, 
that: 
After hearing an appeal the court must 
give judgment without regard to errors 
or defects which do not affect the sub-
stantial rights of the parties. If error 
has been committed, it shall not be pre-
sumed to have resulted in prejudice. The 
court must be satisfied that it has that 
effect before it is warranted in reversing 
the judgment. 
(All emphasis herein is added.) 
In. conformity with the salutary purpose 
of that statute, this Court has many times 
declared that a judgment should not be 
reversed for mere error or irregularity, but 
that should be done only if it appears that 
in the absence thereof there is a reasonable 
likelihood that there would have been a 
different result.3 I cannot believe any such 
State v Crowder, II4 Utah 202, 197 P2d 917 
(1948) 
3. See, e g, State v Neal, l Utah 2d 122, 262 
P 2d 759 (1953), State v ScandretU 24 Utah 2d 
202, 468 P2d 639 (1970) 
